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CONFRONTATION, EXPERTS, AND RULE 
703 
Paul C. Giannelli 
And then came Crawford v. Washington1—the blockbuster 
decision that jettisoned twenty-five years of Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence. Under Crawford, the critical inquiry 
governing admissibility of a hearsay statement became whether it 
is “testimonial” and not whether it is reliable. Following the 
basic principle articulated in Crawford, the holding five years 
later in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts2 became a foregone 
conclusion: a crime laboratory report is simply an expert’s 
affidavit, and thus clearly testimonial.3 Even the outcome of 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico,4 where a surrogate expert introduced 
a lab report, could be considered inevitable—at least to Justice 
Scalia and the dwindling number of his colleagues who share his 
view of testimonial statements. However, Crawford now seems 
endangered, as the Court confronts yet another case involving 
expert testimony: Williams v. Illinois.5 
                                                          
 Distinguished University Professor & Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case 
Western Reserve University. 
1 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
2 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
3 Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion, referred to the facts as 
a “rather straightforward application of our holding in Crawford.” Id. at 
2533.  
4 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
5 At the time this essay was submitted, Williams had not yet been 
decided. See People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 279 (Ill. 2010) (“The 
evidence against the defendant was Lambatos’ opinion [of a DNA match], not 
Cellmark’s report, and the testimony was introduced live on the witness 
stand. Indeed, the report was not admitted into evidence at all. Rather, 
Lambatos testified to her conclusion based upon her own subjective judgment 
about the comparison of the Cellmark report with the existing ISP profile.”), 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2091935
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This essay starts with some thoughts about Federal Evidence 
Rules 703 and 7056 and then makes a few observations about the 
constitutional issue. My thesis is that any Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence involving these rules must appreciate their 
weaknesses. In particular, the Court has failed to appreciate the 
relationship between pretrial discovery and meaningful 
confrontation at trial. My concerns are practical, not doctrinal.7  
I. RULE 703’S RATIONALE 
An expert’s opinion is, of course, only as good as the basis 
on which it rests. If the jury rejects the basis, it should also 
reject the opinion on which it is based. The pre-Rules common 
law limited the bases of expert testimony to (1) personal 
knowledge of the expert or (2) assumed facts—typically 
presented to the expert in the form of a hypothetical question—if 
those assumed facts were supported by the record (known as the 
“record-facts requirement”). Although the hypothetical question 
had long been criticized,8 it had several distinct advantages. It 
informed the jury of the basis of an expert’s opinion prior to the 
giving of the opinion. In addition, the record-facts requirement 
ensured that the basis could be tested by cross-examination when 
the evidence concerning those facts was introduced at trial.  
A. The Reliability Rationale  
Rule 703, along with Rule 705, made the hypothetical 
                                                          
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (U.S. Jun. 28, 2011) (No. 10-8505). 
6 Both rules were recently amended. In December 2011, the “restyled” 
Federal Rules of Evidence became effective. No substantive change was 
intended. Daniel J. Capra, Preface to WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE: 
RESTYLED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, at 1–2 (2d ed. 2011). 
7 For an excellent article examining the confrontation issues prior to 
Melendez-Diaz, see Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the 
Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791 
(2007).  
8 See PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE §5.05[b], at 309 (4th ed. 2007) (“[T]he hypothetical question has 
been criticized as a cumbersome and unwieldy device which often precludes 
the expert from fully explaining her opinion to the jury.”).  
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question optional, but more importantly, these rules made it 
possible for an expert to base an opinion on out-of-court 
statements if it was typical for experts in the field to reasonably 
rely upon such statements. Thus, an expert opinion could be 
based on hearsay (nonrecord facts). The drafters offered a 
reliability rationale to support Rule 703—i.e., experts relied on 
nonrecord facts in their everyday practice and would not do so if 
the information was untrustworthy. The advisory committee 
provided an example most commonly associated with civil 
practice: a physician who makes life and death decisions based 
on X-rays, hospital records, blood tests, and other medical 
documents.9 Nevertheless, from its inception, Rule 703 was 
“controversial,”10 and a 2000 amendment made admissibility of 
hearsay more difficult.11 
B. The Discovery Rationale 
In addition to the reliability rationale, there was another, 
perhaps less appreciated, justification for Rules 703 and 705: 
                                                          
9 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note (1975): 
In this respect the rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert 
opinions beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the 
judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves 
when not in court. Thus a physician in his own practice bases his 
diagnosis on information from numerous sources and of considerable 
variety, including statements by patients and relatives, reports and 
opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital 
records, and X-rays. Most of them are admissible in evidence, but 
only with the expenditure of substantial time in producing and 
examining various authenticating witnesses. The physician makes 
life-and-death decisions in reliance upon them. His validation, 
expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice 
for judicial purposes. 
10 See ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 176 (2d ed. 1991) (“Rule 703 was a 
controversial rule when enacted, and it remains controversial.”).  
11 Inadmissibility of the hearsay basis became the default position. The 
rule now reads: “But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the 
proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative 
value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their 
prejudicial effect.” FED. R. EVID. 703. 
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comprehensive pretrial discovery. According to the drafters, 
Rule 705  
assumes that the cross-examiner has the advance 
knowledge which is essential for effective cross-
examination . . . . Rule 26(b)(4) of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, as revised, provides for substantial discovery 
in this area, obviating in large measure the obstacles 
which have been raised in some instances to discovery of 
findings, underlying data, and even the identity of the 
experts.12  
Thus, informed of the basis of an expert’s opinion through 
discovery, an opposing party has the opportunity to challenge it. 
The combination of these two rationales—reliability and 
extensive pretrial discovery—made the enactment of Rules 703 
and 705 an attractive reform in civil cases. Simplified trials 
coupled with extensive discovery ensured basic fairness. 
Discovery in criminal cases, however, is not comprehensive. 
Indeed, it is meager, at best. Only a few states authorize pretrial 
discovery depositions of witnesses, much less experts.13 
Interrogatories are unheard of. Although expert reports are 
discoverable in criminal litigation, these reports, as the Supreme 
Court reminded us in Melendez-Diaz, often are woefully 
inadequate. According to the Court, the laboratory report in that 
case  
contained only the bare-bones statement that ‘[t]he 
substance was found to contain: Cocaine.’ At the time of 
trial, petitioner did not know what tests the analysts 
performed, whether those tests were routine, and whether 
interpreting their results required the exercise of 
judgment or the use of skills that the analysts may not 
have possessed.14  
                                                          
12 FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee’s note (1975). 
13 See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, ch. 3 (discovery). In 
contrast, most jurisdictions have deposition procedures for the preservation of 
testimony if the witness might be unavailable for trial. Thus, depositions are 
used to preserve the testimony of a party’s own witnesses, not uncover the 
testimony of adverse witnesses. 
14 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009) 
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The National Academy of Sciences’ recent report on forensic 
science makes the same point.15 
A rule justified (at least in part) on the basis of extensive 
pretrial discovery is extremely troublesome, to say the least, if 
that discovery is not provided. Meaningful “confrontation” of an 
in-court expert without adequate discovery is often an 
insurmountable task.16 
Furthermore, the bare-bones lab reports in criminal cases are 
a product of the adversary system, not science. The Journal of 
Forensic Sciences, the official publication of the American 
Academy of Forensic Sciences, published a symposium on the 
ethical responsibilities of forensic scientists in 1989. One Article 
discussed a number of unacceptable laboratory reporting 
practices, including (1) “preparation of reports containing 
minimal information in order not to give the ‘other side’ 
ammunition for cross-examination,” (2) “reporting of findings 
without an interpretation on the assumption that if an 
interpretation is required it can be provided from the witness 
box,” and (3) “[o]mitting some significant point from a report to 
                                                          
(citation omitted).  
15 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 21 (2009). 
 As a general matter, laboratory reports generated as the result of a 
scientific analysis should be complete and thorough. They should 
contain, at minimum, “methods and materials,” “procedures,” 
“results,” “conclusions,” and, as appropriate, sources and 
magnitudes of uncertainty in the procedures and conclusions (e.g., 
levels of confidence). Some forensic science laboratory reports meet 
this standard of reporting, but many do not. Some reports contain 
only identifying and agency information, a brief description of the 
evidence being submitted, a brief description of the types of analysis 
requested, and a short statement of the results (e.g., “the greenish, 
brown plant material in item #1 was identified as marijuana”), and 
they include no mention of methods or any discussion of 
measurement uncertainties.  
Id. 
16 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note (“[I]t is difficult to 
test expert testimony at trial without advance notice and preparation.”); see 
also Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 
44 VAND. L. REV. 791, 798–99 (1991) (discussing the inadequate discovery 
of expert evidence in criminal cases). 
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trap an unsuspecting cross-examiner.”17 In other words, the 
reports are intended to make the trial confrontation of the expert 
more difficult. 
As an example, imagine that a forensic pathologist testifies 
that a person died as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning.18 
This opinion is based partly on an autopsy, which revealed a 
cherry-red skin color that is indicative of carbon monoxide 
poisoning, and the absence of any other cause of death. This 
personal knowledge is supplemented by two other sources of 
information. The first is the report of a toxicologist, which 
revealed the presence of quantifiable amounts of carbon 
monoxide in tissue samples taken from the decedent’s organs 
during the autopsy. The second is a police report regarding the 
scene where the body was found, which revealed that a gas 
stove was on and the windows were shut when the police 
entered the decedent’s apartment.  
In a life insurance case involving a death benefit, Rules 703 
and 705 would permit the pathologist to testify that the cause of 
death was carbon monoxide poisoning, without first disclosing 
the bases of her opinion.19 Neither the toxicologist (another 
expert) nor the first police responder (lay witness) would be 
required to testify.20 In contrast, the common law required both 
to testify at some point in the trial in order for the hypothetical 
question to be valid. 
Under the discovery rules in civil litigation, the opposing 
party would be entitled to a comprehensive expert report,21 
                                                          
17 Douglas M. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities of the Forensic 
Scientist: Exploring the Limits, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 719, 724 (1989) (Lucas 
was the Director of the Centre of Forensic Sciences, Ministry of the Solicitor 
General, Toronto, Ontario).  
18 This example is based on State v. David, 22 S.E.2d 633 (N.C. 1942).  
19 On direct examination, the pathologist may be asked to provide the 
basis of her opinion because it would be more persuasive (not because of any 
evidence rule). 
20 As a practical matter, the police officer would probably be called as a 
witness because his testimony is needed independently of the expert’s 
opinion. 
21 The rule requires that the report must contain: 
(i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and 
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which might spur that party to retain its own expert. In addition, 
the opposing attorney could depose all three participants—the 
pathologist, the toxicologist, and the police officer. 
Interrogatories would probably precede these depositions. In 
contrast, in a criminal case, say for murder, most of this 
discovery is simply not authorized. As noted above, testing the 
reliability of the expert’s opinion is extremely difficult without 
pretrial discovery. 
Now recall the hearsay problem inherent in Rule 703. The 
2000 amendment to Rule 703 makes non-disclosure of the 
hearsay basis of an expert’s opinion the default position. This 
provides some protection, but the opposing party (i.e., the 
accused) is still disadvantaged. The only means of attacking the 
pathologist’s opinion may require disclosure of the hearsay basis 
on cross-examination, which the cross-examiner may not know 
ahead of time because of inadequate discovery. Moreover, 
disclosure may carry a high price: it might inform the jury that 
another expert (the toxicologist) supports the pathologist’s 
opinion regarding the cause of death. An instruction telling the 
jury to limit its consideration of this information to a non-
hearsay purpose would most likely be ineffective.22 The jury 
                                                          
the basis and reasons for them; (ii) the facts or data considered by 
the witness in forming them; (iii) any exhibits that will be used to 
summarize or support them; (iv) the witness’s qualifications, 
including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years; 
(v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the 
witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and (vi) a 
statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony 
in the case. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)–(vi). 
22 Professor Mnookin has rejected the argument that the bases can be 
offered for a non-hearsay purpose: 
 The problem with this argument is that notwithstanding its 
frequent invocation by courts, it makes almost no sense. To be sure, 
the jury might have better grounds for evaluating the expert’s 
testimony if it hears about the data upon which the expert relied for 
her conclusion. But part of a rational evaluation of the expert will 
thus entail an evaluation of her sources—which will inevitably 
involve a judgment about the likelihood that the sources themselves 
are valid and worthy of reliance. In other words, to decide how 
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would probably not understand, much less adhere to, such an 
instruction in this context.23 
In sum, Rules 703 and 705 are problematic as evidence rules in 
criminal cases without even considering Confrontation Clause issues.  
II. RULE 703’S “REASONABLE RELIANCE” REQUIREMENT 
Rule 703 provides: “If experts in the particular field would 
reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an 
opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion 
to be admitted.” What is considered “reasonable reliance” varies 
from field to field. For example, an arson investigator’s opinion on 
the origin and cause of a fire may be based in part on statements of 
eyewitnesses.24 In contrast, a psychiatrist who testifies in an 
insanity case may base her opinion in part on the post-crime 
statements of the defendant’s family and friends.25 Accordingly, the 
“reasonable reliance” requirement requires close scrutiny. 
                                                          
much to credit the expert’s sources, the jury should, logically, first 
assess the odds that they are reliable. And what is this but a 
judgment about the likely truth of their contents? Using the 
information for the permissible purpose of evaluating the expert thus 
necessarily requires a preliminary determination about the 
information’s truth. The permitted purpose is therefore neither 
separate nor separable from an evaluation of the truth of the 
statement’s contents. 
Mnookin, supra note 7, at 816. 
23 See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (“The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be 
overcome by instructions to the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be 
unmitigated fiction.” (citation omitted)); Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 
883, 886 (5th Cir. 1962) (“[I]f you throw a skunk into the jury box, you 
can’t instruct the jury not to smell it.”). 
24 See United States v. Lundy, 809 F.2d 392, 395–96 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(“[H]earsay and third-party observations that are of a type normally relied 
upon by an expert in the field are properly utilized by such an expert in 
developing an expert opinion. . . . [The expert] presented uncontroverted 
evidence that interviews with many witnesses to a fire are a standard 
investigatory technique in cause and origin inquiries.” (citing FED. R. EVID. 
703; United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 301–03 (7th Cir. 1981))).  
25 These witnesses may provide important information about the 
accused’s conduct leading up to the crime. 
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A. Supervising Toxicologist 
A pre-Crawford case, Reardon v. Manson,26 illustrates the 
kinds of problems that the “reasonable reliance” requirement 
raises. In that case, a toxicologist, Dr. Reading, testified about 
the identity of a seized substance (marijuana) based on tests 
performed by a chemist working under his supervision. The 
Second Circuit upheld the practice: “Expert reliance upon the 
output of others does not necessarily violate the confrontation 
clause where the expert is available for questioning concerning 
the nature and reasonableness of his reliance.”27 
Reardon raises numerous issues. First, the term “under the 
supervision” is troublesome. In 1983, Saks and Duizend 
published a study on the use of scientific evidence. Part of their 
investigation involved case studies of different forensic 
techniques. The drug case in their study is the Reardon 
prosecution. They comment:  
In this case, the laboratory in question had three 
doctorate-level toxicologists and 22 or 24 less-
credentialed chemists. The volume of tests performed 
(about 20,000 annually) left the toxicologist an average 
of only a few minutes per day to attend to any given test. 
Is this adequate involvement to justify testifying to the 
findings?28  
In other words, the toxicologist was “supervising” fifty cases 
                                                          
26 Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1986). The case had a long 
legal history before it was heard by the Second Circuit. The Connecticut 
Supreme Court upheld the conviction on appeal. State v. Reardon, 376 A.2d 
65, 67, 69 (Conn. 1977). On habeas review, the Federal District Court for 
the District of Connecticut ruled that the defendant’s right to confrontation 
had been violated. Reardon v. Manson, 491 F. Supp. 982, 988–89 (D. Conn. 
1980). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded on procedural 
grounds. Reardon v. Manson, 644 F.2d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 1981). On 
remand, the district court once again found a confrontation violation, Reardon 
v. Manson, 617 F. Supp. 932 (D. Conn. 1985), and then the Second Circuit 
reversed on the merits, Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1986). 
27 Reardon, 806 F.2d at 42. 
28 MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 49 (1983). 
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a day. As the federal district court noted, “[I]t strains credulity 
to assert that Dr. Reading could personally ‘supervise’ some 50 
of these tests daily.”29 Here, the line between a supervising 
expert and a surrogate witness, as in Bullcoming, is blurred, if 
not erased.  
An understanding of the laboratory procedures demonstrates 
how this blurring occurred.30 According to the toxicologist, his 
laboratory used three different tests to identify marijuana: (1) a 
microscopic test to determine the presence of cystolithic hairs 
that are characteristic of marijuana,31 (2) a chemical color test, 
and (3) thin layer chromatography (TLC).32 Dr. Reading 
admitted, however, that his opinion was not based on the first 
test; he “never personally examined the substance under the 
microscope.”33 He further testified that the TLC and color tests 
were sufficient to identify marijuana. In other words, Dr. 
Reading claimed that a microscopic test required by his 
laboratory’s protocol, that he presumably directed his 
subordinate to perform, was unnecessary! 
Dr. Reading also explained that the TLC and color tests 
“were conducted out of his immediate presence by laboratory 
chemists under his supervision and on oral or hand-written 
                                                          
29 Reardon, 617 F. Supp. at 936. 
30 “The briefs and the opinions focused on the laboratory procedures, 
both technical and administrative, without real evidence of the workloads and 
methods, and reached various differing conclusions about the directness of 
the supervising toxicologist’s observations under the given circumstances.” 
SAKS & VAN DUIZEND, supra note 28, at 49. 
31 See Bruce Stein et al., An Evaluation of Drug Testing Procedures Used 
by Forensic Laboratories and the Qualifications of Their Analysts, 1973 WIS. 
L. REV. 727, 771 (“Cystolith hairs are small hairs on the leaves resembling 
‘bear claws.’ . . . The major difficulty with this test is that many plants have 
cystolith hairs. . . . In the subclass dicotyledon, . . . 600 species 
. . . contained cystolith hairs.”). 
32 State v. Reardon, 376 A.2d 65, 66 (Conn. 1977) (“Dr. Reading 
testified at length . . . as to the manner in which drug identifications were 
conducted in the state toxicological laboratory in this and other similar cases. 
A microscopic test, a thin-layer chromatography test and a chemical test were 
conducted.”). 
33 Reardon v. Manson, 491 F. Supp. 982, 984 (D. Conn. 1980). 
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reports from [the] chemists.”34 Therefore, he lacked personal 
knowledge about issues such as the chain of custody and 
adherence to proper procedures during the time the subordinate 
had possession of the evidence.35 Notably, these closely resemble 
the practices condemned in Bullcoming. 
Second, the procedure sanctioned in Reardon misleads a jury 
into believing that a well-trained toxicologist with a Ph.D. has 
performed the tests personally, when that is not the case. The 
district court noted that substitution of the toxicologist for the 
chemist had become “routine” in Connecticut. According to that 
court,  
it is likely that the State was hoping to take strategic 
advantage of their absence. By not producing the actual 
chemists, the State effectively screened these less-
experienced witnesses from the rigors of cross-
examination. Moreover, in their place, the State 
substituted a witness with great experience both on the 
witness stand and in the practice of forensic medicine, 
whose testimony . . . was buttressed by his doctorate 
degree.36  
This practice may be more misleading than it first appears. 
The Second Circuit refers to the subordinates as “chemists,”37 
which one might assume is someone with a bachelor’s degree in 
chemistry. But this is not necessarily true. The district court 
pointed out that the “record is absolutely devoid of any evidence 
as to the qualifications of the chemists who actually performed 
the tests.”38 A more accurate description may be the one used by 
Saks and Duizend, who referred to them as “technician[s].”39  
Finally, discovery is once again a problem. The Second 
Circuit justified its Reardon holding in part on the defendant’s 
                                                          
34 Id. 
35 “As to other tests where he himself observed the results of the 
experiments, he still was required to assume that the substances tested were 
in fact the substances in question, that the tests had been performed correctly, 
and that the appropriate standards had been used.” Id. at 985. 
36 Id. at 987. 
37 Reardon, 806 F.2d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1986). 
38 Reardon, 617 F. Supp. 932, 935 (D. Conn. 1985). 
39 SAKS & VAN DUIZEND, supra note 28, at 49. 
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pretrial access to the underlying data, asserting that in-court 
confrontation of a supervising expert is sufficient “where the 
defendants have access to the same sources of information 
through subpoena or otherwise.”40 The “otherwise” presumably 
refers to discovery but, as discussed above, such discovery often 
does not exist. 
In sum, the “supervision” cases should not all be treated 
alike. Reardon seems only a step (and a very short one, at that) 
away from what the Court found unacceptable in Bullcoming. 
B. DNA Cases 
Even DNA cases are not all the same. In the typical case 
only one laboratory is involved. However, Williams is not the 
typical DNA case. The crime scene analysis was farmed out to a 
private DNA lab, Cellmark. Although Sandra Lambatos, a state 
DNA analyst, testified that she made an independent assessment 
of the Cellmark report, she also testified that she was not 
familiar with Cellmark’s protocols and that Cellmark had 
different matching rules than her lab. Moreover, Lambatos was 
incapable of answering important questions about the Cellmark 
laboratory. Among these questions were those about personnel 
and procedures. According to DNA Advisory Board 
requirements, each DNA analyst must undergo proficiency 
testing41—how did the Cellmark expert perform on these 
proficiency tests? Each laboratory must undergo audits42 and 
                                                          
40 Reardon, 806 F.2d at 42. 
41 The DNA Identification Act of 1994 required proficiency testing and the 
creation of a DNA Advisory Board to set standards. 42 U.S.C. § 14131 (2006); 
see also DNA ADVISORY BD., QUALITY ASSURANCE STANDARDS FOR FORENSIC 
DNA TESTING LABORATORIES 13.1 (1999) [hereinafter DAB STANDARD], 
available at http://www.cstl.nist.gov/strbase/dabqas.htm (“Examiners and 
other personnel designated by the technical manager or leader who are 
actively engaged in DNA analysis shall undergo, at regular intervals of not to 
exceed 180 days, external proficiency testing in accordance with the 
standards. Such external testing shall be an open proficiency testing 
program.”).  
42 DAB STANDARD 15.1 (“The laboratory shall conduct audits annually 
in accordance with the standards outlined herein.”); Id. at 15.2 (“Once every 
two years, a second agency shall participate in the annual audit.”).  
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keep a corrective action file43—what kind of problems had 
Cellmark experienced, as recorded in the corrective action file? 
If confrontation is going to be meaningful, the defense must 
have the opportunity to confront a witness who knows the 
answers to critical questions, such as those left unanswered in 
Williams. It also needs access to such information before trial.  
III. NOTICE-AND-DEMAND STATUTES 
One final point deserves mention. The adequacy of pretrial 
discovery has an impact on a related Crawford expert issue. In 
Melendez-Diaz, the Court seemed to approve one type of notice-
and-demand statute.44 Such statutes permit the admission of a 
laboratory report if the defense is notified that the prosecution 
intends to introduce the report and the defense fails to demand 
the presence of the analyst as a witness.45 In other words, failure 
to demand the analyst’s presence constitutes a waiver of the 
right of confrontation. Defense counsel, however, cannot 
intelligently waive the presence of the analyst unless she 
understands the basis of the analysis. In short, waiving a client’s 
right of confrontation without knowing far more about the 
                                                          
43 Id. at 14.1 (requiring corrective action procedures “whenever 
proficiency-testing discrepancies and/or analytical errors are detected”). 
44 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 n.3 (2009) 
(“The right to confrontation may, of course, be waived, including by failure 
to object to the offending evidence; and States may adopt procedural rules 
governing the exercise of such objections.”); Id. at 2541 n.12 (“It suffices to 
say that what we have referred to as the ‘simplest form [of] notice-and-
demand statutes,’ is constitutional; that such provisions are in place in a 
number of States; and that in those States, and in other States that require 
confrontation without notice-and-demand, there is no indication that the dire 
consequences predicted by the dissent have materialized.” (citation omitted)). 
45 The Court has yet to directly consider notice-and-demand statutes. In 
Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (per curiam), the Court vacated 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia and “remand[ed] the case for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion in Melendez-Diaz.” 
Although that statute gave the accused the “right to call” the forensic analyst 
“as a witness,” it did not require the Commonwealth to call the analyst in its 
case-in-chief. See Cypress v. Commonwealth, 699 S.E.2d 206, 208 (Va. 
2010). On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court held the statute 
unconstitutional. Id. at 211–13.  
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analysis than is typically provided in criminal discovery would 
be ineffective assistance of counsel.  
CONCLUSION 
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,46 a 1987 decision, a plurality of 
the Supreme Court took the position that the right of 
confrontation is a trial right and “does not include the power to 
require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that 
might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony.”47 It 
seems likely, given this holding, that the Supreme Court may 
continue to fail to account for the inadequacy of pretrial 
discovery in its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. The Court 
should revisit this issue. The provision of adequate discovery is 
critical to meaningful trial confrontation. 
 
                                                          
46 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
47 Id. at 52–53. In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, who cast the 
deciding vote, disagreed with the plurality: “In my view, there might well be 
a confrontation violation if, as here, a defendant is denied pretrial access to 
information that would make possible effective cross-examination of a crucial 
prosecution witness.” Id. at 61–62 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). In dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall 
agreed:  
The creation of a significant impediment to the conduct of cross-
examination thus undercuts the protections of the Confrontation 
Clause, even if that impediment is not erected at the trial itself. In 
this case, the foreclosure of access to prior statements of the 
testifying victim deprived the defendant of material crucial to the 
conduct of cross-examination. 
Id. at 71 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Scalia dissented on 
procedural grounds. Id. at 72–78 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674–78 (1985) (rejecting the Court of 
Appeals’ right of confrontation approach in favor of a due process analysis). 
